ByPasskey
Passkeys were never designed to protect a compromised website, but those are now too common to ignore.
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On November 2026, a vulnerability in Optimizely's web experimentation platform let an attacker serve malicious JavaScript to visitors of at least 178 of the most popular organizations, including Zoom, Salesforce and the BBC, for roughly 17 hours before being detected.
Passkey's "gold standard" reputation rests on phishing resistance, which depends wholly on a trusted login page. When that page runs attacker code, even a hardware-protected credential can authenticate a session issued to an attacker.
On a compromised page, a passkey sign-in can log the attacker in instead of the user, and Optimizely showed how realistic that is.
For brevity, "passkey" here refers to the broader FIDO2 family, including hardware security keys.
The ByPasskey demonstration shows the result with a real passkey:

Authentication and session security
By design, the hardware protection of a passkey does not extend to the application session. WebAuthn provides no binding between the authenticator that approved the login and the subsequent session use.
WebAuthn explicitly recognizes the risks of code injection on a trusted origin. The deliberate separation between authentication and session binding exposes a significant limitation in WebAuthn's security guarantees. This attack demonstrates how easily it can be exploited, without needing to compromise the authentication key.
Origin compromise is a relevant threat assumption
The malicious code this attack requires can arrive through cross-site scripting, compromised dependencies, or privileged access to application code, all long treated as out of scope for authentication. Optimizely shows how difficult that exclusion is to defend. The injected code ran on every page that loaded an affected snippet, and wherever such a snippet loads on a sign-in page, that is enough to relay passkey logins.
Weeks earlier, PHP2Shell exposed servers to unauthenticated code execution, and eMudhra exposed recoverable private keys in trusted certificate infrastructure. To our knowledge, this relay has not yet been used in the wild, but excluding origin compromise from a protocol's guarantees does not remove the need to address it in the wider security architecture.
Why session defenses do not help
Common session protections such as HttpOnly cookies do not help, because the session is created in the attacker's browser and nothing is taken from the victim's. Chrome's Device Bound Session Credentials bind a session to the browser that completes the login, which in this attack is the attacker's. Having the passkey sign a page-supplied session key fails similarly, since a compromised page can supply the attacker's key. Removing the malicious script does not revoke sessions created while it was active.
Binding authentication to session use
To close this gap, the missing requirement is continuity of binding: a verifiable connection between authentication and the subsequent use of the authority it creates.
One approach that would close it is for the authenticator to generate a protected session key during authentication and include its public key in the signed response. The server binds the session to that key and requires fresh proofs when the session is used. Such an approach would require extending the WebAuthn API like this:
The demo prototypes it with a simulated authenticator. Real support would require work through standards committees.
Even then, an actively compromised client may still request or relay valid operations. Session binding alone limits independent reuse of captured credentials; it does not eliminate misuse through that client.
Continuity in TideCloak
Tide implements session binding throughout a broader set of security operations.
Its BYOiD authentication establishes device-bound session keys during authentication. Signed delegation binds permissions for protected cryptographic operations to that session, while end-to-end encryption binds data decryption to that same session. A delegation token alone is insufficient without the corresponding session key. While Tide can't prevent a compromised client from relaying malicious operations, it offers a verifiable trust boundary to detect it.
TideCloak provides these capabilities in an existing identity platform. Enforced DPoP extends key binding to application tokens, and distributed signing reduces reliance on any single server or human operator.
For operations covered by these controls, TideCloak provides a stronger continuity model than passkey authentication followed by a bearer session. Authentication, delegated authority and protected data access remain tied to session keys.
Today, passkey deployments need equivalent continuity to support their broader claim about "best of breed" account security.